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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRIAN RAY BROADWATER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
CaseNo.20010702-CA 
(Lower Docket 005907720) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant believes that the facts are accurately stated in his opening 
brief. These additional facts support the appellant's arguments. Officer Gardiner 
testified that he and Officer Hunt parked their patrol cars behind the appellant's 
vehicle and Officer Gardiner stated that they used their takedown spotlights to 
illuminate the interior or passenger area of the appellant's vehicle and that it was 
quite a lot of light. Appellant's Opening Brief Addendum C at 9. 
Officer Gardiner testified that he did not know what permission the appellant 
may have received to be sleeping in the parking lot. Appellant's Opening Brief 
Addendum C at 8. When the officers approached the appellant's vehicle, Officer 
Gardiner testified that he had no reason to believe that the appellant had committed 
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a crime except his hunches or feelings. Appellant's Opening Brief Addendum C at 
12. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
THE ENCOUNTER WAS CONSENSUAL. 
Discussion 
The lower court incorrectly ruled that the encounter was consensual. The 
City has argued that the standard set out by this Court in State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 
1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), does not apply to this case. In fact the city has argued 
that it was quite possible that the appellant was unaware of the officers' presence 
until they knocked on the window with their flashlights. See Appellee's Brief at 
13. The City ignores the fact that both officers shined their takedown spotlights on 
the appellant's vehicle. See Appellant's Brief Addendum C at 6. Their actions in 
shining the spotlights on the appellant's vehicle was a seizure. The United States 
Supreme Court has also said that a person is seized when "by means of physical 
force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained." United States 
v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980). This court needs to look at "whether 
defendant remained, not in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's investigation, 
but because he believed he was not free to leave." State v. Smith. 781 P.2d 879, 
881 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In this case the appellant would not feel free to leave 
when two police vehicles are parked anywhere near him with their spotlights 
shined on his vehicle and officers are walking toward him with flashlights pointed 
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toward him. 
Contrary to the City's assertion the facts in this case are similar to the case 
of State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In the Struhs case, this 
Court held that where a deputy and her partner drove down the road with their 
lights off, stopped about one car length^way from defendant's vehicle nose to 
nose, and turned on the police vehicle's high beam headlights and the truck's white 
'takedown' light, the deputies had seized the defendant even though the defendant 
was not completely blocked in. Id at 1227-28. In this case the takedown lights 
were activated and the appellant's vehicle was not completely blocked in. Still, as 
this Court noted in Struhs. the officer's actions in using their white takedown 
spotlights was a controlling factor. Id This City's Brief ignores what is stated in 
footnote 3 of the Struhs opinion: 
Under Utah law, non emergency vehicles would not be able to 
approach defendant and shine their lights on the defendant as the 
officer did in this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-129(d) (1993) 
("Any lighted head lamps upon a parked vehicle shall be depressed or 
dimmed."); id. § 41-6-131 (stating requirements for spot lamps on 
vehicles and noting exceptions for emergency vehicles). 
Id- at 1228. 
This conduct was a detention which was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion. The lower court's ruling to the contrary is incorrect. 
In addition, both officers proceeded to approach the appellant's vehicle on 
either side and pounded on the windows. Appellant's Opening Brief Addendum C 
at 13, 22. Further, the opening of the door by the officer was a seizure and in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Officer 
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Gardiner testified that he immediately opened the driver side door as would have 
been his practice in situations such as this one. Appellant's Opening Brief 
Addendum C at 7. The officer's action in opening the car door is a seizure and a 
reasonable person would not feel free to leave. The lower court's ruling that the 
appellant was not seized by the officers I conduct is an incorrect application of the 
law to the facts. 
II. THE OFFICERS LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION TO 
DETAIN THE APPELLANT. 
Discussion 
In order for an officer legally to detain an individual, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that the officer must have reasonable suspicion based on 
specific and articulable facts "that criminal activity is afoot." Terry v. Ohio. 392 
U.S. 1, 30, 88, S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The City for the first time is 
asking this Court to let stand the officers' conduct by arguing that the officer was 
investigating a trespass. The City ignores Officer Gardiner's testimony that he had 
no reason to believe that the appellant had committed any crime except his hunches 
or feelings. Appellant's Opening Brief Addendum C at 12. Further, specifically 
relating to any trespass, the officer testified that he did not know what if any 
permission the appellant may have received to be sleeping in the parking lot. 
Appellant's Opening Brief Addendum C at 8. 
The officers in this case did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the 
appellant and without reasonable suspicion the opening of the door was unlawful. 
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In order to support conduct such as what happened in this case officers must have a 
reasonable suspicion based on objective facts and not hunches as the officers stated 
in this case. 
Here, there was no reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the 
appellant had committed any crime. In fact Officer Gardiner testified throughout 
that there was nothing suspicious of a particular crime and that the officer just had 
a hunch or feeling that the appellant might be involved in criminal activity. See 
Appellant's Opening B~'ef Addendum C at 10,13-15,20-21. In fact Officer 
Gardiner testified that he only had a feeling. Addendum C at 20. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that in order to make a lawful 
detention of an individual, "the officer must be able to articulate something more 
than 'an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'"' United States v. 
Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581,1585 (1989). 
In this case the fact that the appellant was merely sleeping in his vehicle 
does not give rise to reasonable suspicion and does not support the detention. The 
fact that the officers were called to a private parking lot late at night by an 
anonymous tip does not create reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity. 
The detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and for those stated in Appellant's Opening Brief, 
the appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the lower court's order 
denying the motion to suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _± day of July, 2002. 
Benjamin A. Hamilton 
Attorney for Appellant 
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